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MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION FOR COMMISSION GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICATION OF THE DEFINITION OF AN AI SYSTEM AND THE PROHIBITED AI PRACTICES ESTABLISHED IN THE AI ACT

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION FOR COMMISSION GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICATION OF THE DEFINITION OF AN AI SYSTEM AND THE PROHIBITED AI PRACTICES ESTABLISHED IN THE AI ACT

Disclaimer: This document is a working document for consultation and does not prejudge the final decision that the Commission may take on the final guidelines. The responses to this consultation paper will provide important input to the Commission when preparing the guidelines.

The <u>European Al Office</u> is launching this multi-stakeholder consultation on the application of the definition of an Al system and the prohibited Al practices established in the Al Act. This consultation is targeted to stakeholders of different categories, including providers and deployers of Al systems such as businesses, authorities (including local public authorities) and other organisations, academia and research institutions, trade unions and other workers' representatives, civil society organisations, public supervisory authorities, and the general public.

As not all questions may be relevant for all stakeholders, respondents may reply only to the section(s) and the questions they consider relevant. Respondents are

encouraged to provide **explanations and concrete cases** as part of their responses to support the practical usefulness of the guidelines.

The targeted consultation is available in English only and will be open for 4 weeks starting on 13 November until 11 December 2024. We strongly encourage early submissions.

The questionnaire for this consultation is structured along 2 sections with several questions.

- 1. Questions in relation to the definition of an AI system
- 2. Questions in relation to prohibited Al practices

We **welcome collective answers from organisations.** You have the option to indicate if you a submitting such a collective answer in the end of the first section and identify the organisations on whose behalf the submission is made.

We welcome full or partial replies from all respondents based on their expertise and perspective.

All contributions to this consultation may be made publicly available.

Therefore, please do not share any confidential information in your contribution. Individuals can request to have personal information removed from their contribution.

The Commission may publish a summary of the results of the consultation. In that case, results will be based on aggregated data and respondents will not be directly quoted.

Please allow enough time to submit your application before the deadline to avoid any issues. In case you experience technical problems which prevent you from submitting your application within the deadline, please take screenshots of the issue and the time it occurred.

In case you face any technical difficulties or would like to ask a question, please contact: CNECT-AIOFFICE@ec.europa.eu

General Introduction

The Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, hereinafter 'the AI Act'), which entered into force on 1 August 2024, improves the internal market by laying down harmonised rules for trustworthy and human-centric Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the EU (Article 1 AI Act). It aims to promote innovation and uptake of AI, while ensuring a high level of protection of health, safety and fundamental rights, including democracy and the rule of law.

The AI Act establishes a common definition of an AI system, aligned with the OECD definition (OECD Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence (OECD /LEGAL/0449, 2019, amended 2023)), as a central element of the scope of the AI Act (Article 3(1) AI Act and Recital 12). The AI Act follows a risk-based approach to regulating AI systems, by classifying such systems into different risk categories. One of which are the prohibited AI practices covering AI systems posing unacceptable risks to fundamental rights and European values (Article 5 AI Act).

Pursuant to Article 96(1) Al Act, the Commission must develop guidelines on the practical implementation of the Regulation, *inter alia*, on the prohibited Al practices referred to in Article 5 Al Act and the application of the definition of an Al system as set out in Article 3(1).

The purpose of the present targeted stakeholder consultation is to collect input from a wide range of stakeholders on concrete examples of AI systems and issues with the practical application of the relevant AI Act provisions that could be clarified in the Commission's **guidelines** on the **definition of an 'AI system'** as well as guidelines on the **prohibited AI practices**. The definitions and prohibitions are applicable six months after the entry into force of the AI Act, as from 2 February 2025. The input from this consultation will feed into the Commission guidelines to be adopted in early 2025. It should be noted that the

legal concepts in relation to the AI system definition and the prohibitions are already set out in the AI Act. The Commission launches the present consultation to seek additional practical examples from stakeholders to feed into the guidelines and provide further clarity on practical aspects and use cases.

The objective of the guidelines is to provide consistent interpretation and practical guidance to assist competent authorities in their enforcement actions as well as providers and deployers subject to the AI Act in their compliance actions with a view to ensuring consistent, effective and uniform application of the prohibitions and understanding of what constitutes an AI system within the scope of the AI Act.

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*1. Do you represent one or more organisations (e.g., industry organisation or civil
society organisation) or act in your personal capacity (e.g., independent expert)?

- Organisation(s)
- In a personal capacity

duje.prkut@protonmail.com

If you	are organisation(s), please specify the name(s):
P	olitiscope
If you	u would like to share any affiliation, please specify:
*First	name
D	uje
*Surna	ame
P	rkut
*E-Ma	ail address (this won't be published)

*Are you headquartered/residing in the EU? Yes O No Other (e.g. multiple organisations) * Headquarter / Country of residence AF - Afghanistan AL - Albania DZ - Algeria AD - Andorra O AO - Angola AG - Antigua and Barbuda AR - Argentina AM - Armenia AU - Australia AT - Austria AZ - Azerbaijan BS - Bahamas BH - Bahrain BD - Bangladesh BB - Barbados BY - Belarus BE - Belgium BZ - Belize BJ - Benin BT - Bhutan BO - Bolivia BA - Bosnia and Herzegovina BW - Botswana BR - Brazil BN - Brunei Darussalam BG - Bulgaria BF - Burkina Faso BI - Burundi CV - Cabo Verde

- KH Cambodia
- CM Cameroon
- CA Canada
- CF Central African Republic
- TD Chad
- CL Chile
- CN China
- CO Colombia
- KM Comoros
- CG Congo
- CR Costa Rica
- CI Côte D'Ivoire
- HR Croatia
- CU Cuba
- CY Cyprus
- CZ Czechia
- CD Democratic Republic of the Congo
- DK Denmark
- DJ Djibouti
- DM Dominica
- DO Dominican Republic
- EC Ecuador
- EG Egypt
- SV El Salvador
- GQ Equatorial Guinea
- ER Eritrea
- EE Estonia
- SZ Eswatini
- ET Ethiopia
- FJ Fiji
- FI Finland
- FR France
- GA Gabon
- GM Gambia

- GE Georgia
- DE Germany
- GH Ghana
- GR Greece
- OB Grenada
- GT Guatemala
- ON Guinea
- GW Guinea Bissau
- GY Guyana
- HT Haiti
- HN Honduras
- HU Hungary
- IS Iceland
- IN India
- D Indonesia
- IR Iran
- IQ Iraq
- IE Ireland
- IL Israel
- IT Italy
- JM Jamaica
- JP Japan
- O JO Jordan
- KZ Kazakhstan
- KE Kenya
- KI Kiribati
- KW Kuwait
- KG Kyrgyzstan
- LA Laos
- LV Latvia
- LB Lebanon
- LS Lesotho
- LR Liberia
- LY Libya

- LI Liechtenstein
- LT Lithuania
- LU Luxembourg
- MG Madagascar
- MW Malawi
- MY Malaysia
- MV Maldives
- ML Mali
- MT Malta
- MH Marshall Islands
- MR Mauritania
- MU Mauritius
- MX Mexico
- FM Micronesia
- MC Monaco
- MN Mongolia
- ME Montenegro
- MA Morocco
- MZ Mozambique
- MM Myanmar
- NA Namibia
- NR Nauru
- NP Nepal
- NL Netherlands
- NZ New Zealand
- NI Nicaragua
- NE Niger
- NG Nigeria
- KP North Korea
- MK North Macedonia
- NO Norway
- OM Oman
- PK Pakistan
- PW Palau

- PA Panama
- PG Papua New Guinea
- PY Paraguay
- PE Peru
- PH Philippines
- PL Poland
- PT Portugal
- QA Qatar
- MD Republic of Moldova
- RO Romania
- RU Russian Federation
- RW Rwanda
- KN Saint Kitts and Nevis
- LC Saint Lucia
- VC Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
- WS Samoa
- SM San Marino
- ST Sao Tome and Principe
- SA Saudi Arabia
- SN Senegal
- RS Serbia
- SC Seychelles
- SL Sierra Leone
- SG Singapore
- SK Slovakia
- SI Slovenia
- SB Solomon Islands
- SO Somalia
- ZA South Africa
- KR South Korea
- SS South Sudan
- ES Spain
- LK Sri Lanka
- SD Sudan

SR - Suriname	
SE - Sweden	
CH - Switzerland	
SY - Syrian Arab Republic	
TJ - Tajikistan	
TZ - Tanzania	
TH - Thailand	
TL - Timor-Leste	
TG - Togo	
TO - Tonga	
TT - Trinidad and Tobago	
TN - Tunisia	
TR - Turkey	
TM - Turkmenistan	
TV - Tuvalu	
UG - Uganda	
UA - Ukraine	
AE - United Arab Emirates	
GB - United Kingdom	
US - United States of America	
UY - Uruguay	
UZ - Uzbekistan	
VU - Vanuatu	
VE - Venezuela	
VN - Viet Nam	
YE - Yemen	
ZM - Zambia	
ZW - Zimbabwe	
*Do you have an office or other kind of representation in the EU?	
Yes, we have a subsidiary, branch office or similar in the EU	
Yes, other	
No	
Not applicable	

If applicable, please specify
*If you are an organisation, what is the size of your organisation and does it qualify as a small or medium sized enterprise according to the EU recommendation 2003 /361, if applicable? Small Medium Large Other (e.g. multiple organisations, local authorities)
Not applicable
If other, please specify
*Which stakeholder category would you consider yourself in? Provider of an Al system Deployer of an Al system Other industry organisation, or acting on behalf of such organisations Academia Civil Society Organisation Public authority Citizen Others If other, please specify
*In which sector do you operate? Information technology Public sector Law enforcement Security Media Media

Heal	<u>thcare</u>
Emp	<u>loyment</u>
Educ	eation eation
Cons	sumer services
Busii	ness services
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If other, pl	ease specify phts
1000 charac	efly describe the activities of your organisation or yourself: ter(s) maximum Executive Director of Politiscope, a privacy watchdog organization based in Split, Croatia.
Is your org Yes No	ganisation submitting a collective answer on behalf of other organisations?
Not a	applicable
Please sp	ecify
A II	butions to this consultation may be made publicly available

All contributions to this consultation may be made publicly available.

Therefore, please do not share any confidential information in your contribution. For organisations, their organisation details would be published while respondent details can be requested to be anonymised. Individuals can request

to have their contribution fully anonymised. Your e-mail address will never be published.

Please select the privacy option that best suits you. Privacy options default based on the type of respondent selected.

*For natural persons: Contribution publication privacy settings

If you act in your personal capacity: All contributions to this consultation may be made publicly available. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

- Anonymous. The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, your answer regarding residence, and your contribution may be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself.
- Public. Your name, the type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, your answer regarding EU nationality, and your contribution may be published.
- Not applicable

*For organisations: Contribution publication privacy settings

If you represent one or more organisations: All contributions to this consultation may be made publicly available. You can choose whether you would like respondent details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

- Anonymous. Only organisation details may be published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its size, its presence in or outside the EU and your contribution may be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.
- Public. Organisation details and respondent details may be published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its size, its presence in or outside the EU and your contribution may be published as received. Your name will also be published.
- Not applicable

Privacy statement

I acknowledge the attached privacy statement.

Privacy_Statement.pdf

Questionnaire

Section 1. Questions in relation to the definition of an AI system

The **definition of an Al system** is key to understanding the scope of application of the Al Act. It is a first step in the assessment whether an Al system falls into the scope of the Al Act.

The definition of an 'AI system' as provided in Article 3(1) AI Act is aligned with the OECD definition: 'AI system means a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments.'

Recital 12 provides further clarifications on the definition of an Al system.

The following seven elements can be extracted from the definition:

- 1) 'a machine-based system'
- 2) 'designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy'
- 3) 'may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment',
- 4) 'for explicit or implicit objectives',
- 5) 'infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs'
- 6) 'predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions'
- 7) 'can influence physical or virtual environments'

Question 1: Elements of the definition of an Al system

The definition of the AI system in Article 3(1) AI Act can be understood to include the above mentioned main elements. The key purpose of the definition of an AI system is to provide characteristics that distinguish AI systems from

'simpler traditional software systems or programming approaches'. A key distinguishing characteristic of an AI system is its capability to infer, from the input it receives how to generate outputs. This capability of inference, covers both the process of obtaining output in the post-deployment phase of an AI system as well as the capability of an AI system to derive models or algorithms or both from inputs or data at the pre-deployment phase. Other characteristics of an AI system definition such as the system's level of autonomy, type of objectives, and degree of adaptiveness, help to define main elements of the AI system as well as to provide clarity on the nature of the AI system but are not decisive for distinguishing between AI systems and other type of software systems. In particular, AI systems that are built on one of the AI techniques but remain static after deployment triggered questions related to the scope of the AI Act, understanding of the concept of inference and the interplay between the different characteristics of the AI system definition. The guidelines are expected to provide explanation on the main elements of the AI system definition.

1.1: Based on Article 3(1) and Recital 12 Al Act, what elements of the definition of an Al system, in particular, require further clarification in addition to the guidance already provided in Recital 12?

Elements of an Al system - please rate the importance of further clarification from 1 to 10, 10 indicating 'most important':

01	chine based system'
Only	alues between 1 and 10 are allowed
1	
desi	ned to operate with varying levels of autonomy'
Only	alues between 1 and 10 are allowed
5	
	exhibit adaptiveness after deployment'
may	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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Only values between 1 and 10 are allowed

1

'infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs'

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'predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions'

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'can influence physical or virtual environments'

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Only values between 1 and 10 are allowed

1
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Explain why one or more of these elements require further clarification and what part of this element needs further practical guidance for application in real world applications?

1500 character(s) maximum

Any attempt to rigidly define autonomy risks creating arbitrary distinctions between systems, based solely on varying degrees of autonomy across different stages and aspects of operation.

Inference should be defined broadly as the process of deriving conclusions from inputs using any reasoning method, whether through machine learning algorithms or rule-based logic in expert systems.

As emphasized in the next answer, the definition of AI should prioritize the actual impact of the system on fundamental rights over the specifics of its technical implementation.

Question 2: Simple software systems out of scope of the definition of an Al system

The AI Act does not apply to all software systems but only to systems defined as 'AI systems' in accordance with Article 3(1) AI Act. According to recital 12, the notion of AI system should be distinguished from 'simpler traditional software systems or programming approaches and should not cover systems that are based on the rules defined solely by natural persons to automatically execute operations'. In particular the use of statistical methods, such as logistic regression, triggered questions related to the conditions under which certain software systems should be considered out of the scope of AI system definition. The Commission guidelines are expected to provide methodology for distinguishing AI systems from simpler traditional software systems or

programming approaches and thus would help define systems that are outside the scope of the Al Act.

Please provide examples of software systems or programming approaches that **does not fall** under the scope of the AI system definition in Article 3(1) AI Act and explain why, in your opinion, the examples are not covered by one or more of the seven main elements of the definition of an AI system in Article 3(1) AI Act.

1500 character(s) maximum

While the need for a legal definition of AI systems is clear, the current proposed definition places excessive emphasis on technical attributes, overlooking the broader sociopolitical implications of AI. AI should be defined broadly, with greater weight given to its potential effects on individuals' rights rather than technical implementation. Impact should be prioritized over considerations on technical characteristics.

Over-focusing on technical details invites loopholes, enabling developers to reframe high-risk AI as simpler rule-based systems while maintaining same associated risks, all in an effort to illegitimately but legally avoid regulatory scrutiny.

We propose for approach in which all algorithmic and predictive systems fall under the scope of the Act. The burden of proof for exclusion should lie with developers, assessed on a case-by-case basis to ensure that systems with significant societal or individual impacts remain subject to appropriate safeguards and regulatory oversight. This inclusive, impact-driven definition will foster both accountability and flexibility, ensuring the Al Act achieves its aim of protecting rights while encouraging responsible innovation.

Further more, we find it would be detrimental to public's trust in the AI Act if it would not apply in cases such as the infamous SyRI - Dutch welfare fraud risk-scoring algorithm.

Section 2. Questions in relation to the prohibitions (Article 5 Al Act)

Article 5 AI Act prohibits the placing on the EU market, putting into service, or the use of certain AI systems that can be misused and provide novel and powerful tools for manipulative, exploitative, social control and/or surveillance practices.

The Commission guidelines are expected to include an introductory section explaining the general interplay of the prohibitions with other Union legal acts, the high-risk category and general-purpose AI systems as well as relevant specifications of some horizontal concepts such as provider and deployer of AI systems, 'placement on the market', 'putting into service' and 'use' and relevant exceptions and exclusions from the scope of the AI Act (e.g. research, testing and development; military, defense and national security, personal non-professional activity).

Pursuant to Article 5(1) Al Act, the following practices are prohibited in relation to Al systems:

Article 5(1)(a) – Harmful subliminal, manipulative and deceptive techniques

Article 5(1)(b) - Harmful exploitation of vulnerabilities

Article 5(1)(c) – Unacceptable social scoring

Article 5(1)(d) – Individual crime risk assessment and prediction (with some exceptions)

Article 5(1)(e) – Untargeted scraping of internet or CCTV material to develop or expand facial recognition databases

Article 5(1)(f) – Emotion recognition in the areas of workplace and education (with some exceptions)

Article 5(1)(g) – Biometric categorisation to infer certain sensitive categories (with some exceptions)

Article 5(1)(h) – Real-time remote biometric identification (RBI) in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement purposes (with some exceptions)

This section includes questions on each of the aforementioned prohibitions separately and one final question pertaining to all prohibitions alike and the interplay with other acts of Union law.

A. Questions in relation to harmful subliminal, manipulative or deceptive practices

The prohibition under Article 5(1)(a) Al Act targets Al systems that deploy subliminal techniques, purposefully manipulative or deceptive techniques that materially influence behaviour of people or aim to do so in significantly harmful ways. The underlying rationale of this prohibition is to protect individual autonomy and well-being from manipulative, deceptive and exploitative Al practices that can subvert and impair individuals' autonomy, decision-making, and free choice.

Proposed structure of the guidelines

It is proposed that the Commission guidelines would cover the following aspects regarding Article 5(1)(a) AI Act:

- Rationale and objectives of the prohibition
- Main elements of the prohibition
 - Al systems deploying subliminal, purposefully manipulative and deceptive techniques
 - with the objective or the effect of materially distorting behaviour
 - in a manner (reasonably likely to) cause significant harm
- Al systems out of scope of the prohibition
- Interplay with other Union law (e.g. data protection, consumer protection, digital services regulation, criminal law)

Main elements of the prohibition

Several **cumulative elements must be in place** at the same time for the prohibition in Article 5(1)(a) Al Act to apply:

- 1) The activity must constitute 'placing on the market' (Article 3(9) Al Act), 'putt ing into service' (Article 3(11) Al Act), or 'use' of an Al system (Article 3(1) Al Act). The prohibition applies to both providers and deployers of Al systems, each within their own responsibilities.
- 2) The AI system must 'deploy **subliminal techniques** beyond a person's consciousness (e.g. deploying imperceptible images or audio sounds), **purposef**

ully manipulative (e.g. exploiting cognitive biases, emotional or other manipulative techniques) or deceptive techniques' (e.g. presenting false and misleading information to deceive individuals and influence their decisions in a manner that undermines their free choices). These techniques are alternative, but they can also apply in combination.

- 3) The techniques deployed by the AI system should have the objective or the effect of materially distorting the behaviour of a person or a group of persons. The distortion must appreciably impair their ability to make an informed decision, resulting in a decision that the person or the group of persons would not have otherwise made. This requires a substantial impact whereby the technique deployed by the AI system does not merely influence a person's (or group of persons) decision, but should be capable of effectively undermining their individual autonomy and ability to make an informed and independent free choice. This suggests that 'material distortion' involves a degree of coercion, manipulation or deception that goes beyond lawful persuasion that falls outside the ban.
- 4) The distorted behaviour must cause or be reasonably likely to cause significant harm to that person, another person, or a group of persons. In this context, important concepts that will be examined in the guidelines are the types of harms covered, the threshold of significance of the harm and its reasonable likelihood from the perspective of the provider and/or the deployer. 'Significant harms' implies sufficiently important adverse impacts on physical, psychological health or financial interests of persons and groups of persons that can be compound with broader group and societal harms. The determination of 'significant harm' is fact and context specific, necessitating careful consideration of each case's individual circumstances.

For the prohibition to apply, all elements must be in place and there must be a causal link between the techniques deployed, the material distortion of the behaviour of the person and the significant harm that has resulted or is reasonably likely to result from that behaviour.

Question 3: Taking into account the provisions of the Al Act, what elements of the prohibition of harmful manipulation and deception do you think require further clarification in the Commission guidelines?

Please select all relevant options from the list

- placement on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system
- deploying subliminal, purposefully manipulative or deceptive techniques
- with the objective or the effect of materially distorting behaviour of a person or groups of persons
- in a manner that causes or is reasonably likely to cause significant harm
- none of the above

Please explain why the elements selected above require further clarification and what needs to be further clarified in the Commission guidelines?

1500 character(s) maximum

Since subliminal manipulation is not a well-established legal concept, it is crucial for Commission guidelines to provide clear and practical clarifications. While recitals 28 and 29 offer valuable insights, their lack of legal binding authority limits it's impact and practical application.

As mentioned above, the notion of "significant harm" needs to be further explained as it is key in rendering a practice prohibited or not. Examples or a tool similar to the risk assessment ones (severity vs likelihood) can be used to measure harm or the likelihood of this harm occurring.

Question 4: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> that in your opinion fulfil all elements of the prohibition described above?

- Yes
- O No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and how all the necessary elements described above are fulfilled

1500 character(s) maximum

The weaponization of social media by both state and non-state actors remains a significant threat to modern democracies. Through influence and manipulation campaigns, these actors aim to polarize societies, sow discord, and promote authoritarianism over democratic values and the rule of law. Numerous reports from the U.S. intelligence and security community have detailed Russia's efforts to interfere with political systems in the United States and EU member states. Within this context, AI has become a pivotal tool, enhancing the sophistication and scale of these campaigns, enabling targeted disinformation, and amplifying divisive narratives. An increasing number of scholars are drawing direct links between recent shifts in democratic political systems across the globe and the virality of political and social content imbued with negative emotions such as hate, fear, and distrust. This emotionally charged content not only drives engagement but also exacerbates polarization, undermining democratic norms and fostering societal divisions. The enabling and detrimental role of AI and content moderation algorithms needs to be closely examined.

Question 5: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> where you need further clarification regarding certain elements of this prohibition to determine whether the AI system is in the scope of the prohibition or not?

Yes

0	No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice as well as the specific elements you would need further clarification in this regard

13	00 character(s) maximum

B. Questions in relation to harmful exploitation of vulnerabilities

The prohibition under Article 5(1)(b) AI Act targets AI systems that exploit vulnerabilities of certain persons or groups of persons that materially influence behaviour of people or aim to do so in a significantly harmful way. The underlying rationale of the prohibition is to protect individual autonomy and well-being from exploitative AI practices that can subvert and impair individuals' autonomy, decision-making, and free choice similar. This prohibition in particular aims to protect those that are most vulnerable and susceptible to manipulation and exploitation because of their specific characteristics that make them particularly vulnerable due to their age, disability and or specific socio-economic situation.

Proposed structure of the guidelines

It is proposed that the Commission guidelines would cover the following aspects regarding Article 5(1)(b) AI Act:

- Rationale and objectives of the prohibition
- Main elements of the prohibition
 - Al system exploiting vulnerabilities due to age, disability or specific socio-economic situation
 - with the objective or the effect of materially distorting behaviour
 - in a manner (reasonably likely to) cause significant harm

- Interplay between the prohibitions in Article 5(1)(a) and (b) Al Act, with the latter acting as lex specialis in case of overlap
- Al systems out of scope of the prohibition
- Interplay with other Union law (e.g. data protection, non-discrimination law, digital services regulation, criminal law)

Main elements of the prohibition

Several **cumulative elements must be in place** at the same time for the prohibition in Article 5(1)(b) Al Act to apply:

- 1) The activity must constitute 'placing on the market' (Article 3(9) Al Act), 'putt ing into service' (Article 3(11) Al Act), or 'use' of an Al system (Article 3(1) Al Act). The prohibition applies to both providers and deployers of Al systems, each within their own responsibilities.
- 2) The AI system must exploit vulnerabilities due to age (covering both children as well as elderly), disability (as defined in EU equality law encompassing a wide range of physical, mental, intellectual and sensory impairments that hinder full participation of individuals in the society), or specific socio-economic situations (e.g. persons living in extreme poverty, ethnic or religious minorities). Vulnerabilities of these persons should be understood to encompass a broad spectrum of categories, including cognitive, emotional, physical and other forms of susceptibility that can affect the ability of an individual or a group of persons pertaining to those groups to make informed decisions or otherwise influence their behaviour. 'Exploitation' should be understood as objectively making use of such vulnerabilities in a manner which is harmful for the exploited vulnerable (groups of) persons and/or other persons.
- 3. The techniques deployed by the AI system should have the **objective or the effect of materially distorting the behaviour** of a person or a group of persons. Article 5(1)(a) and (b) AI Act make use of the same concept and should therefore be interpreted in the same way to the extent they overlap.
- 4. The distorted behaviour must cause or be reasonably likely to cause

significant harm to that person, another person, or a group of persons. Article 5 (1)(a) and (b) Al Act make use of the same concept and should therefore be interpreted in the same way, while taking into account that the harms that can be suffered by vulnerable groups can be particularly severe and multifaceted due to their heightened susceptibility to exploitation.

For the prohibition to apply, all elements must be in place and there must be a causal link between the vulnerability exploitation by the AI system, the material distortion of the behaviour of the person and the significant harm that has resulted or is reasonably likely to result from that behaviour.

Question 6: Taking into account the provisions of the Al Act, what elements of the
prohibition of harmful exploitation of vulnerabilities do you think require further
clarification in the Commission guidelines?
Please select all relevant options from the list
placement on the market, putting into service or use of an Al system
exploiting vulnerabilities due to age, disability or specific socio-economic situation
with the objective or the effect of materially distorting behaviour of a person or groups of persons
in a manner that causes or is reasonably likely to cause significant harm none of the above
Please explain why the elements selected above require further clarification and
what needs to be further clarified in the Commission guidelines? 1500 character(s) maximum
Question 7: Do you have or know concrete examples of Al systems that in your

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and how all the necessary elements described above are fulfilled

Yes

O No

Sensitive Data Targeted Advertising – case of TikTok and Mental Health: Investigations uncovered that TikTok's recommendation system could deduce users' mental health conditions, such as anxiety or depression, from their activity patterns. In some instances, the platform reportedly promoted content that worsened these issues, sparking ethical concerns about user well-being and the potential for manipulation.

Chatbots Amplifying Hate Speech and Propaganda – case of Microsoft Tay: The chatbot was manipulated by malicious users, leading it to generate offensive and discriminatory statements. The absence of robust safeguards allowed harmful content to proliferate until the bot was deactivated.

Al Promoting Risky Financial Decisions – case of Robinhood App: Critics accused the platform of gamifying investment decisions, using notifications to push users toward high-risk trades. One tragic incident involved a user who misinterpreted his financial status and took his own life, a tragedy partially linked to the app's design and notifications.

Question 8: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> where you need further clarification regarding certain elements of this prohibition to determine whether the AI system is in the scope of the prohibition or not?

- Yes
- No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice as well as the specific elements you would need further clarification in this regard

1500	character(s) maximum			

C. Questions in relation to unacceptable social scoring practices

The prohibition under Article 5(1)(c) AI Act aims to prevent 'social scoring' practices that evaluate persons over a certain period of time based on their social behaviour or personal characteristics leading to detrimental and unfair outcomes for certain individuals and groups. The prohibition applies in principle to both the public and the private sector. The underlying rationale of this prohibition is to prevent such unacceptable 'social scoring' practices that may lead to discriminatory and unfair outcomes for certain individuals and groups, including their exclusion from society. The prohibition of 'social scoring' aims to protect in particular the right to human dignity and other fundamental rights, including the right to non-discrimination and equality, to data protection and to

private and family life. It also aims to safeguard and promote the European values of democracy, equality and justice.

Proposed structure of the guidelines

It is proposed that the Commission guidelines would cover the following aspects regarding Article 5(1)(c) Al Act:

- Rationale and objectives of the prohibition
- Main elements of the prohibition
 - 'Social scoring': evaluation or classification based on social behaviour or personal or personality characteristics over a certain period of time
 - Whether provided or used by public or private entities
 - Leading to detrimental or unfavourable treatment in unrelated social contexts and/or unjustified or disproportionate treatment
- Al systems out of scope of the prohibition
- Interplay with other Union law (e.g. data protection, non-discrimination)

Main elements of the prohibition

Several **cumulative elements must be in place** at the same time for the prohibition in Article 5(1)(c) Al Act to apply:

- 1) The activity must constitute 'placing on the market' (Article 3(9) Al Act), 'putt ing into service' (Article 3(11) Al Act), or 'use' of an Al system (Article 3(1) Al Act). The prohibition applies to both providers and deployers of Al systems, each within their own responsibilities.
- 2) The AI systems must be intended or used for the **evaluation or classification** of natural persons or groups of persons over a certain period of time based on: (i)their **social behaviour**; or
- (ii) known, inferred or predicted personal or personality characteristics;
- 3) The social score created with the assistance of the AI system must lead to the **detrimental or unfavourable treatment** in one or more of the following scenarios:

- (i) in social contexts unrelated to those in which the data was originally generated or collected; and/or
- (ii)treatment that is unjustified or disproportionate to their social behaviour or its gravity.

The detrimental or unfavourable treatment must be the consequence of the score, and the score the cause of the treatment. It is not necessary for the evaluation performed by the AI system to be 'solely' leading to the detrimental or unfavourable treatment (covering thus AI-enabled scoring practices that may be also subject to or combined with other human assessments). At the same time, the AI output has to play a sufficiently important role in the formation of the social score. For the prohibition to apply all elements described above must be in place at the same time.

Question 9: Taking into account the provisions of the AI Act, what elements of the prohibition of social scoring do you think require further clarification in the Commission guidelines?

lease	e select all relevant options from the list
	placement on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system
	for the evaluation or classification of natural persons or groups of persons over
	a certain period of time based on their social behaviour, or known, inferred or
	predicted personal or personality characteristics
	with the social score leading to the detrimental or unfavourable treatment of
	the person or groups of persons
	in social contexts unrelated to those in which the data was originally generated or collected
	treatment that is unjustified or disproportionate to their social behaviour or its
	gravity
1	none of the above

Please explain why the elements selected above require further clarification and

what needs to be further clarified in the Commission guidelines?

1500 character(s) maximum

	YesNo
PΙ	ease specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and how all the
	cessary elements described above are fulfilled 500 character(s) maximum
,	order de la contraction (e) maximum
	In Rotterdam, a social scoring system was introduced to assess individuals' trustworthiness, particularly to identify potential fraudsters among welfare recipients. Among 315 data points which served as inputs, more than a few seem problematic - the length of someone's last romantic relationship, ability to convince and influence others, how many times someone has emailed the city, whether someone plays sports. The outcome of being scored as high risk led to repeated investigations, deprivation of social benefits and seriously deteriorated individuals mental health.
	The Dutch government employed the System Risk Indication (SyRI) to detect fraud across various sectors, including social benefits and taxes. This tool processed a wide array of data, such as household composition, debts, and even dog ownership, identifying "anomalies" as potential indicators of fraud. The tool disproportionately targeted low-income communities, increasing surveillance and triggering invasive home checks. In 2020, the Hague District Court ruled that SyRI violated the European Convention on Human Rights, as it breached individuals' right to privacy and dignity, particularly in lower-income neighborhoods
	uestion 11: Do you have or know concrete examples of AI systems where you ed further clarification regarding certain elements of this prohibition to determine
	nether the AI system is in the scope of the prohibition or not?
	© Yes
	No
ΡI	ease specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice as well as the
sp	ecific elements you would need further clarification in this regard
1	500 character(s) maximum

Question 10: Do you have or know concrete examples of Al systems that in your

D. Questions in relation to individual crime risk assessment and prediction

The prohibition under Article 5(1)(d) Al Act targets Al systems assessing or predicting the risk of a natural person committing a criminal offence solely based on profiling or assessing personality traits and characteristics, without objective

and verifiable facts directly linked to criminal activity and a human assessment thereof. The underlying rationale for the ban is to prevent unacceptable law enforcement practices where AI is used to make an individual a suspect solely based on profiling or their personality traits and characteristics rather than as support of human assessment, which is already based on objective and verifiable facts directly linked to a criminal activity. Such predictive crime and policing AI systems pose an 'unacceptable risk' since they infringe fundamental rights and freedoms in a democracy that is based on rule of law and requires a fair, equal and just criminal legal system. They also endanger individual's liberty without the necessary procedural and judicial safeguards and violate the right to be presumed innocent. Other fundamental rights at risk that the ban aims to safeguard are the right to human dignity, non-discrimination, the right to fair trial, the right to defence, effective remedy, privacy and data protection and the rights of the child if these practices affect children.

Proposed structure of the guidelines

It is proposed that the Commission guidelines would cover the following aspects regarding Article 5(1)(d) AI Act:

- Rationale and objectives of the prohibition
- Main elements of the prohibition
 - Individual crime prediction of a natural person committing a criminal offence
 - solely based on profiling or the assessment of personality traits and characteristics
 - without verifiable facts directly linked to criminal activity and human assessment thereof
- Interplay with other Union law (e.g. data protection)
- Al systems that are out of the scope of the prohibition (e.g. support of the human assessment)

Main elements of the prohibition

Several **cumulative elements must be in place** at the same time for the prohibition in Article 5(1)(d) Al Act to apply:

- 1) The activity must constitute 'placing on the market' (Article 3(9) Al Act), 'putt ing into service for this specific purpose' (Article 3(11) Al Act), or 'use' of an Al system (Article 3(1) Al Act). The prohibition applies to both providers and deployers of Al systems, each within their own responsibilities.
- 2) The AI system must be intended or used for the specific purpose of making a risk assessment or prediction of a natural person or persons committing a criminal offence. The individual crime predictions can be made at any stage of the law enforcement activities such as prevention and detection of crimes, but also investigation, prosecution and execution of criminal penalties. Excluded from the scope are therefore location- and event-based predictions and individual predictions of administrative offences since these are not assessing the risk of individuals committing a criminal offence.
- 3) The assessment or the prediction must be **solely** based on either or both of the following:
- (i)**profiling** of a natural person (defined in Article 4(4) of the General Data Protection Regulation as any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person), or
- (ii) assessing a person's personality traits and characteristics (such as nationality, place of birth, place of residence, number of children, level of debt or type of car)
- 4) Excluded are **AI systems used to support human assessment based on objective and verifiable facts directly linked to a criminal activity**. This means that predictive AI tools could be used for supporting the human assessment of the involvement of a person in the criminal activity if there are objective and verifiable facts linked to a criminal activity on the basis of which a person can be reasonably suspected of being involved in a criminal activity.

Question 12: Taking into account the provisions of the Al Act, what elements of the prohibition of harmful manipulation and deception do you think require further clarification in the Commission guidelines?

Please select all relevant options from the list

placement on the market, putting into service or use of an Al system

for making risk assessment or prediction of a natural person or persons committing a criminal offence
solely based on the profiling of a natural person or their traits and characteristics
 excluded are AI systems used to support human assessment based on objective and verifiable facts directly linked to a criminal activity none of the above
Please explain why the elements selected above require further clarification and what needs to be further clarified in the Commission guidelines? 1500 character(s) maximum
Question 13: Do you have or know concrete examples of AI systems that in your opinion fulfil all elements of the prohibition described above? Yes

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and how all the necessary elements described above are fulfilled

1500 character(s) maximum

O No

ProKid Predictive Policing System:

Implemented by Dutch law enforcement in 2011, the ProKid system evaluates the probability of children or young people becoming involved in criminal activity or being added to police records. Although the predictions do not specify particular crimes, their implications are profound. Families flagged by the system faced increased surveillance, with some children being referred to youth care or child protection services, and, in severe cases, removed from their homes. The system has raised concerns about its impact on children's rights and family integrity.

ETIAS Regulation and Risk Profiling:

The ETIAS system employs automated profiling to assess travellers against predefined risk categories, encompassing potential migration violations, security concerns, and public health issues. Risk scores are generated using various data points, including historical trends of visa overstays, security alerts from EU member states, and personal characteristics such as nationality or education level. This predictive profiling, often linked to "pre-crime" concepts, anticipates potential illegal activities without evidence of actual offenses. These practices result in significant consequences for individuals, influencing decisions like entry refusal or criminal investigation, despite the absence of direct criminal conduct.

Question 14: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> where you need further clarification regarding certain elements of this prohibition to determine whether the AI system is in the scope of the prohibition or not?



1500 character(s) maximum	ld need further clarification in this regard
necessary criteria for the p systems that support the h	e or know concrete examples of AI systems that fulfil all prohibition to apply, but fall under the exception of uman assessment of the involvement of a person in a objective and verifiable facts linked to a criminal activity?
No Please specify the concrete exception would apply and 1500 character(s) maximum	e AI system, how it is used in practice and which I why

E. Questions in relation to untargeted scraping of facial images

Article 5(1)(e) AI Act prohibits AI systems with the specific purpose of creating or expanding facial recognition databases through untargeted scraping of the internet or CCTV footage.

As to the rationale of the prohibition, untargeted scraping of a large number of facial images from the Internet or CCTV material, along with associated metadata and information, without consent of the data subject(s), to create large-scale facial databases, violates individuals' rights and individuals lose the possibility to be anonymous. Recital 43 of the AI Act justifies the prohibition of Article 5(1)(e) AI Act based on the 'feeling of mass surveillance' and the risks of 'gross violations of fundamental rights, including the right to privacy'.

Proposed structure of the guidelines

Yes

O No

It is proposed that the Commission guidelines would cover the following aspects regarding Article 5(1)(e) Al Act:

- Rationale and objectives of the prohibition
- Main elements of the prohibition
 - Facial recognition databases
 - through untargeted scraping of facial images
 - from the internet or CCTV footage
- Al systems out of scope of the prohibition
- Interplay with other Union law (e.g. data protection)

Main elements of the prohibition

Several **cumulative elements must be in place** at the same time for the prohibition in Article 5(1)(e) Al Act to apply:

- 1) The activity must constitute 'placing on the market' (Article 3(9) Al Act), 'putt ing into service for this specific purpose' (Article 3(11) Al Act), or 'use' of an Al system (Article 3(1) Al Act). The prohibition applies to both providers and deployers of Al systems, each within their own responsibilities.
- 2) The AI system must be intended or used for the specific purpose of untargeted scraping. The prohibition applies to **scraping AI systems** that are placed on the market or being put into service 'for this specific purpose' of **untarg eted scraping of the internet/CCTV** material. This implies that the prohibition does not apply to all scraping tools with which one can build up a database, but only to tools for untargeted scraping.
- 3) The prohibition covers AI system used to **create or expand facial recognition databases**. Database in this context refers to any collection of data, or information, that is specially organized for rapid search and retrieval by a computer. A facial recognition database is a technology that matches a human face from a digital image or video frame against a database of faces, compares it to the database and determines whether there is a match in the database.
- 4) The sources of the images are either the Internet or CCTV footage.

Question 16: Taking into account the provisions of the Al Act, what elements of the prohibition of untargeted scraping of facial images do you think require further clarification in the guidelines?

Please select all relevant options from the list
placement on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system
for creating or expanding facial recognition databases
through untargeted scraping of facial images
from the internet or CCTV footage
none of the above

Please explain why the elements selected above require further clarification and what needs to be further clarified in the guidelines?

1500 character(s) maximum

Without clear interpretative guidance from the Commission, the targeted scraping of facial images may not be adequately recognized as prohibited. It is essential for the guidelines to incorporate the principles established by CJEU rulings, which effectively restrict scraping facial images unless it serves to establish a connection to a serious criminal offense.

Question 17: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> that in your opinion fulfil all elements of the prohibition described above?

Yes

O No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and how all the necessary elements described above are fulfilled

1500 character(s) maximum

Clearview AI and PimEyes business practices have already been deemed as illegal by several European Data protection Agencies. It is of utmost importance these provisions and accompanying guidelines are not used to legitimize the use of these tools.

Question 18: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> where you need further clarification regarding certain elements of this prohibition to determine whether the AI system is in the scope of the prohibition or not?

Yes

No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice as well as the specific elements you would need further clarification in this regard

1500 character(s) maximum

F. Questions in relation to emotion recognition

Article 5(1)(f) Al Act prohibits Al systems to infer emotions in the areas of workplace and education institutions except for medical or safety reasons.

As to the rationale of the prohibition, emotion recognition technology is quickly evolving and comprises different technologies and processing operations to detect, collect, analyse, categorise, re- and interact and learn emotions from persons. Emotion recognition can be used in multiple areas and domains for a wide range of applications, such as for analysing customer behaviour, targeted advertising, in the entertainment industry, in medicine and healthcare, in education, employment, wellbeing, or for law enforcement and public safety.

Emotion recognition can lead to 'discriminatory outcomes and can be intrusive to the rights and freedoms of the concerned persons', in particular the right to privacy. It is therefore in principle prohibited in asymmetric relationships in the context of workplace and education institutions, where both workers and students are in particularly vulnerable positions. The AI Act states in Recital 44 that there are 'serious concerns about the scientific basis of AI systems aiming to identify or infer emotions, particularly as expression of emotions vary considerably across cultures and situations, and even within a single individual. Among the key shortcomings of such systems are the limited reliability, the lack of specificity and the limited generalisability.' At the same time, emotion recognition in specific use contexts, such as for safety and medical care (e.g. health treatment and diagnosis) has benefits and is therefore not prohibited. In such cases, emotion recognition is classified as a high-risk AI system and subjected to requirements aimed to ensure accuracy, reliability and safety.

Proposed structure of the guidelines

It is proposed that the Commission guidelines would cover the following aspects regarding Article 5(1)(f) AI Act:

Rationale and objectives of the prohibition

- Main elements of the prohibition
 - Al systems to infer emotions
 - Identification and inference of emotions
 - Emotions
 - On the basis of their biometric data
- · Limitation of the prohibition to workplace and educational institutions
 - Workplace
 - Educational institutions
- Exceptions for medical and safety reasons
- More favourable Member State law
- Al systems out of scope of the prohibition
- Interplay with other Union law (e.g. data protection)

Main elements of the prohibition

Several **cumulative elements must be in place** at the same time for the prohibition in Article 5(1)(f) Al Act to apply:

- 1) The activity must constitute 'placing on the market' (Article 3(9) Al Act), 'putt ing into service for this specific purpose' (Article 3(11) Al Act), or 'use' of an Al system (Article 3(1) Al Act). The prohibition applies to both providers and deployers of Al systems, each within their own responsibilities.
- 2) Al systems to infer emotions, as defined in the light of Article 3(39) Al Act, are systems for identifying or inferring emotions or intentions of natural persons on the basis of their biometric data. 'Identification' occurs when the processing of the biometric data (for example, of the voice or a facial expression) allows to directly compare and identify with an emotion that has been previously programmed in the emotion recognition system. 'Inferring' is done by deducing information generated by analytical and other processes by the system itself. In this case, the information about the emotion is not solely based on data collected on the natural person, but it is concluded from other data, including machine learning approaches that learn from data how to detect emotions. Emotions have to be defined in a broad sense, but do not include physical states such as pain or fatigue and readily apparent expressions such as smiles.

- 3) The prohibition in Article 5(1)(f) Al Act is limited to emotion recognition systems in the 'areas of workplace and educational institutions', because there is a power imbalance, an asymmetric relation and a risk of continuous surveillance.
- 4) The prohibition contains an explicit exception for emotion recognition systems used in the areas of the workplace and educational institutions for medical or safety reasons, such as systems for therapeutical use.

Question 19: Taking into account the provisions of the Al Act, what elements of the prohibition of emotion recognition in the areas of workplace and education do you think require further clarification in the Commission guidelines?

Please select all relevant options from the list

- placement on the market, putting into service or use of an Al system
- for identifying or inferring emotions of natural persons
- in the area of workplace and educational institutions
- except for medical and safety reasons
- none of the above

Please explain why the elements selected above require further clarification and what needs to be further clarified in the Commission guidelines?

1500 character(s) maximum

The benefit of exception for workplace and for safety reasons is difficult to ascertain, especially taking into account fatigue detection is already excluded.

Smile should not be considered a "readily apparent expression" and reference to it should be removed.

Question 20: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> that in your opinion fulfil all elements of the prohibition described above?

- Yes
- O No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and how all the necessary elements described above are fulfilled

1500 character(s) maximum

iBorderCTRL Emotion Recognition System

The iBorderCTRL pilot project aimed to assess the emotional states of travelers entering the EU to determine the veracity of their statements during immigration interviews. Designed as a support tool for border guards, the system fits within the category of emotion recognition technologies.

Constructor Tech Al Proctoring System

Constructor Tech's Al-powered proctoring system is designed to monitor and analyze student behavior during exams. It uses pattern recognition to evaluate actions in real-time, comparing them against standard test-taking conditions. The system tracks eye and head movements, flagging behaviors that deviate from expected norms. This advanced tracking raises questions about privacy and the ethical implications of constant surveillance during assessments.

Question 21: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> where you need further clarification regarding certain elements of this prohibition to determine whether the AI system is in the scope of the prohibition or not?

- Yes
- [⊚] No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice as well as the specific elements you would need further clarification in this regard

1500 character(s) maximum

The guidelines should clarify that legitimate health and safety systems such as voice monitors that analyze emergency calls to detect if a person is having a heart attack; safety systems to detect if personnel are wearing protective headgear; systems detecting driver fatigue are not emotion recognition systems. At the same time, we urge the Commission to clarify that systems which attribute an emotion to the person presented as medical or safety tools, should not be categorized as medical or safety devices, given that they suffer from serious, fundamental flaws in their scientific underpinnings and therefore could lead to serious life-threatening consequences for persons subjected to these tools. We urge the Commission to make this distinction in the guidelines.

Question 22: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> that fulfil all necessary criteria for the prohibition to apply, but fall under the exception of medical and safety reasons?

- Yes
- O No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and which exception would apply and why

1500 character(s) maximum		

G. Questions in relation to biometric categorisation

Article 5(1)(g) Al Act prohibits biometric categorisation systems (as defined in

Article 3(40) AI Act) that categorise individually natural persons based on their biometric data to deduce or infer their race, political opinions, trade union membership, religious or philosophical beliefs, sex life or sexual orientation. This prohibition does not cover the lawful labelling, filtering or categorisation of biometric data sets acquired in line with Union or national law according to biometric data, which can for example be used in the area of law enforcement (Recital 30 AI Act).

As to the rationale of the prohibition, AI-based biometric categorisation systems for the purpose of assigning natural persons to specific groups or categories relating to aspects such as sexual or political orientation or race violate human dignity and pose significant risks to other fundamental rights such as privacy and discrimination.

A wide variety of information, including 'sensitive' information can be extracted, deduced or inferred from biometric information, even without the individuals knowing it, to categorise them. This can lead to unfair and discriminatory treatment, for example when a service is denied because somebody is considered to be of a certain race.

Proposed structure of the guidelines

It is proposed that the Commission guidelines would cover the following aspects regarding Article 5(1)(g) Al Act:

- Rationale and objectives of the prohibition
- Main elements of the prohibition:
 - Biometric categorisation system
 - Persons are individually categorised based on their biometric data
 - To deduce or infer their race, political opinions, trade union membership, religious or philosophical beliefs, sex life or sexual orientation
 - On the basis of their biometric data
- Al systems out of scope of the prohibition
 - Labelling and filtering based on biometric data
- Interplay with other Union law (e.g. data protection)

Main elements of the prohibition

Several **cumulative elements must be in place** at the same time for the prohibition in Article 5(1)(g) Al Act to apply:

- 1) The activity must constitute 'placing on the market' (Article 3(9) Al Act), 'putt ing into service for this specific purpose' (Article 3(11) Al Act), or 'use' of an Al system (Article 3(1) Al Act). The prohibition applies to both providers and deployers of Al systems, each within their own responsibilities.
- 2) The AI system must be a **biometric categorisation system** for the purpose of assigning natural persons to specific categories on the basis of their biometric data, unless it is ancillary to another commercial service and strictly necessary for objective technical reasons (Article 3(40) AI Act).
- 3) Individual persons are categorised,
- 4) Based on their biometric data (Article 3(34) Al Act),
- 5) Article 5(1)(g) Al Act prohibits only biometric categorisation systems which have as objective to deduce or infer a limited number of sensitive characteristics: race, political opinions, trade union membership, religious or philosophical beliefs, sex life or sexual orientation.

The prohibition does not **cover labelling or filtering of lawfully acquired biometric datasets**, including in the field of law enforcement.

Question 23: Taking into account the provisions of the Al Act, what elements of the prohibition of biometric categorisation to infer certain sensitive characteristics do you think require further clarification in the Commission guidelines?

	Please select	all re	elevant	options	from	the	list
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	placement on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system
	that is a biometric categorisation system individually categorising natural
	persons based on their biometric data
V	to deduce or infer their race, political opinions, trade union membership,
	religious or philosophical beliefs, sex life or sexual orientation

excluded are labelling or filtering of lawfully acquired biometric datasets, including in the field of law enforcement none of the above
Please explain why the elements selected above require further clarification and what needs to be further clarified in the Commission guidelines? 1500 character(s) maximum
It should be clarified provisions also relate to inferences about "ethnicity" and "gender identity".
Question 24: Do you have or know concrete examples of AI systems that in your opinion fulfil all elements of the prohibition described above? Yes No
Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and how all the necessary elements described above are fulfilled 1500 character(s) maximum
Question 25: Do you have or know concrete examples of Al systems where you need further clarification regarding certain elements of this prohibition to determine whether the Al system is in the scope of the prohibition or not? Yes No
Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice as well as the specific elements you would need further clarification in this regard 1500 character(s) maximum
Question 26: Do you have or know concrete examples of AI systems that fulfil all necessary criteria for the prohibition to apply, but fall under the exception of labelling or filtering of lawfully acquired biometric datasets? Yes No
Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and which

exception would apply and why

41

1	00 character(s) maximum

H. Questions in relation to real-time remote biometric identification

Article 5(1)(h) AI Act contains a prohibition on real-time use of remote biometric identification systems (Article 3(41) and (42) AI Act) in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement purposes subject to limited exceptions exhaustively and narrowly defined in the AI Act.

Recital 32 AI Act acknowledges 'the intrusive nature of remote biometric identification systems (RBIS) to the rights and freedoms of the concerned persons, to the extent that it may affect the private life of a large part of the population, evoke a feeling of constant surveillance and indirectly dissuade the exercise of the freedom of assembly and other fundamental rights. Technical inaccuracies of AI systems intended for the remote biometric identification of natural persons can lead to biased results and entail discriminatory effects. Such possible biased results and discriminatory effects are particularly relevant with regard to age, ethnicity, race, sex or disabilities. In addition, the immediacy of the impact and the limited opportunities for further checks or corrections in relation to the use of such systems operating in real-time carry heightened risks for the rights and freedoms of the persons concerned in the context of, or impacted by, law enforcement activities.'

At European level, RBIS are already regulated by EU data protection rules, as they process personal and biometric data for their functioning.

Due to the serious interferences that real-time RBI use for the purpose of law enforcement poses to fundamental rights, its deployment is, in principle, prohibited under the AI Act. However, as most of these fundamental rights are not absolute, objectives of general interest, such as public security, can justify restrictions on exercising these rights as provided by Article 52(1) of the Charter. Any limitation must comply with the requirements of legality, necessity, proportionality and respect for the essence of fundamental rights. Therefore, when the use is strictly necessary to achieve a substantial public interest and

when the exceptions are exhaustively listed and narrowly defined, their use outweighs the risks to fundamental rights (Recital 33 AI Act). To ensure that these systems are used in a 'responsible and proportionate manner', their use can only be made if they fall under one of the explicit exceptions defined in Article 5(1)(i) to (iii) AI Act and subject to safeguards and specific obligations and requirements, which are detailed in Article 5(2)-(7) AI Act. When the use falls under one or more of the exceptions, the remote biometric identification system is classified as a high-risk AI system and subject to requirements aimed to ensure accuracy, reliability and safety.

Proposed structure of the guidelines

It is proposed that the Commission guidelines would cover the following aspects regarding Article 5(1)(h) AI Act:

- Rationale and objectives of the prohibition
- Definition of
 - remote biometric identification
 - 'real-time'
 - publicly accessible spaces
 - law enforcement purposes
- Al systems out of scope of the prohibition
- Interplay with other Union law
- Conditions and safeguards for exceptions

Main elements of the prohibition

Several **cumulative elements must be in place** at the same time for the prohibition in Article 5(1)(h) Al Act to apply:

- 1) The activity must constitute **the 'use' of an Al system** (Article 3(1) Al Act), so, contrary to the previously mentioned prohibitions, this prohibition applies only to deployers of Al systems.
- 2) The AI system must be a **remote biometric identification system** (Article 3 (41) AI Act), i.e. an AI system for the purpose of identifying natural persons, **with**

out their active involvement, typically at a distance through the comparison of a person's biometric data with the biometric data contained in a reference database. This excludes systems for verification or authentication of persons.

- 3) The system is used in 'real-time' (Article 3(42) Al Act), i.e. the biometric systems capture and further process biometric data 'instantaneously, near-instantaneously or in any event without any significant delay.
- 4) The AI system is used in **publicly accessible spaces**, i.e. 'any publicly or privately owned physical space accessible to an undetermined number of natural persons, regardless of whether certain conditions for access may apply, and regardless of the potential capacity restrictions'. This excludes online spaces, border control points and prisons.
- 5) The prohibition of Article 5(1)(h) Al Act applies to **law enforcement purposes**, irrespective of the entity, authority, or body carrying out the activities. Law enforcement is defined in Article 3(46) Al Act as the 'activities carried out by law enforcement authorities or on their behalf for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including safeguarding against and preventing threats to public security.' These activities are also those that constitute the subject matters in Article 1 of the Law Enforcement Directive.

Question 27: Taking into account the provisions of the Al Act, what elements of the prohibition of real-time remote biometric identification for law enforcement purposes do you think require further clarification in the Commission guidelines?

Please select all relevant options from the list

use of an AI system

that is a remote biometric identification system

used 'real-time'

for law enforcement purposes

in publicly accessible spaces

none of the above

Please explain why the elements selected above require further clarification and what needs to be further clarified in the Commission guidelines?

We also caution against the misuse of the term "authentication" and call on the Commission to clarify this in the Guidelines. It is only through technical "verification" that a person can be "authenticated". Conversely "authentication" is an outcome, not a process. A system which matches people against a pre-enrolled database cannot be considered authentication, but rather closed-set identification. The guidelines must not allow users of any closed-set identification systems to claim that they are doing "authentication" and are therefore not subject to this prohibition.

Lastly, to prevent circumvention of the ban, we recommend that the "significant delay" entailed to make a system not be considered real-time should be a minimum of 24 hours after capture, and must only relate to the processing of inputs from legally-seized material.

Question 28: Do you have or know concrete examples of Al systems where you
need further clarification regarding certain elements of this prohibition to determine
whether the AI system is in the scope of the prohibition or not?

	\/
\circ	Yes

O No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice as well as the specific elements you would need further clarification in this regard

1	500 character(s) maximum	

Article 5(1)(h)(i) to (iii) AI Act provides for three exceptions to the prohibition for:

- (1) The **targeted search** of victims of abduction, trafficking in human beings or sexual exploitation of human beings, as well as the search for missing persons, i. e. persons whose existence has become uncertain, because he or she has disappeared.
- (2) The prevention of a **specific**, **substantial and imminent threat** to the life or physical safety of natural persons or a genuine and present or genuine and foreseeable threat of a terrorist attack. A terrorist attack can include a threat to life, whereas a threat to life does not necessarily qualify as a terrorist attack.
- (3) The localisation and identification of a person suspected of having committed a criminal offence, for the purpose of conducting a criminal investigation or prosecution or executing a criminal penalty for offences

referred to in Annex II and punishable in the Member States concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least four years. Annex II of the AI Act provides an exhaustive list of serious crimes for which the real-time use of RBI can be authorised.

The exceptions have to be authorised by national legislation and comply with certain conditions and safeguards (Article 5(2) to (7) AI Act). These include – among others – temporal, geographic and personal limitations, a duty to perform a fundamental rights impact assessment and to register the system in the EU database (Article 49 AI Act), a need for prior authorisation by a judicial or independent administrative authority, and a notification to the relevant market surveillance authorities and data protection authorities.

Question 29: Do you have or know <u>concrete examples of AI systems</u> that fulfil all necessary criteria for the prohibition to apply, but which could fall under one or more of the exceptions of Article 5(1)(h)(i) to (iii) AI Act?

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O No

Please specify the concrete AI system, how it is used in practice and which exception would apply and why

1	500 character(s) maximum		

Question 30: Do you need further clarification regarding one or more of the exceptions of Article 5(1)(h)(i) to (iii) Al Act or the conditions or safeguards under Article 5(2) to (7) Al Act?

Yes

O No

Please specify the concrete condition or safeguard and the issues for you need further clarification; please provide concrete examples

1500 character(s) maximum

The AI Act acknowledges the significant risks that RBIS pose to fundamental rights. Such uses conflict with the Charter of Fundamental Rights because the associated rights limitations are neither necessary nor proportionate. This interpretation aligns with the Italian Data Protection Authority's decision on the SARI system, which deemed it a form of mass surveillance, and with the EDPB's 2023 guidelines.

It is essential for the Commission to clarify that the absence of a prohibition under the AI Act does not equate to the lawfulness of any RBIS. Each use case, including those listed in Annex II, must undergo rigorous case-by-case assessments to determine its legality.

To mitigate the significant harms enabled by the AI Act's exceptions to the ban on certain RBIS uses, the Commission must ensure these exceptions are narrowly confined in scope, geography, duration, and applicability to individuals, minimizing risks of misuse. Exceptions should explicitly exclude petty crimes, in accordance with CJEU case law.

The guidelines must strictly interpret the concept of a "targeted search," ensuring alignment with CJEU case law. This includes establishing that the individual being sought is likely to be present in the monitored area. The Commission should also specify criteria for assessing "imminent threats" to prevent generalized surveillance triggered solely by elevated alert statuses.

I. Question in relation to interplay with other Union legislation

The prohibitions under the AI Act are without prejudice to prohibitions and specific rules provided for in other Union legislation such as data protection, consumer protection, digital services regulation, etc. As explained above, each section of the Commission guidelines are expected to explain relevant interplay of the prohibitions in relation to other Union law.

Question 31: Do you have or know concrete examples of AI systems where you need further clarification regarding the application of one or more of the prohibitions under the AI Act in relation to other Union legislation?

Yes
No

Please specify the concrete AI system and the prohibition under the AI Act, the relevant provision of a specific Union legislation and where further clarification is needed

1:	1500 character(s) maximum			

Thank you

Thank you for your interest in participating in the consultation. Please do not forget to click on submit.

Contact

Contact Form